A credible safeguards regime for Australian uranium exports depends on having a credible safeguards agency. Sadly, the federal government’s Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) is anything but.
Nuclear Safeguards and Australian Uranium Export Policy — Friends of the Earth Australia, by Jim Green 25 Jan 2010 There is a long history of nuclear power facilitating nuclear weapons programs …….The larger part of the problem is real or feigned interest in nuclear power providing a rationale for the acquisition of enrichment plants, reprocessing plants and research reactors and a rationale for the development of cadres of nuclear scientists and engineers whose skills can be put to use in weapons programs…………
Important information about safeguards is kept secret by the Australian government and there is a compelling case for greater transparency. Examples of unwarranted secrecy include the refusal to publicly release: country-by-country information on the separation and stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium………
A credible safeguards regime for Australian uranium exports depends on having a credible safeguards agency. Sadly, the federal government’s Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) is anything but. For example, during the 2008 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties inquiry into the Howard-Putin uranium export agreement, ASNO conspicuously failed to inform the Committee that there has not been a single IAEA safeguards inspection in Russia since 2001 and instead misled the Committee with the indefensible claim that (non-existent) safeguards would “ensure” peaceful use of AONM in Russia.
Nuclear Safeguards and Australian Uranium Export Policy — Friends of the Earth Australia
Tags: antinuclear, Australia, nuclear issues, nuclear secrets, nuclear weapons, weapons and war
